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Enforcement of Statutory Rights of Employees"
of Government Contractors
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States government disburses a vast amount of money
each year to meet its contractual obligations. As the size of the federal
government and the dimension of the services it provides continue
to expand, the importance of federal contract spending in our national
economy is likely to reach staggering proportions.' Presently there
are a great many manufacturing, construction, and brokerage con-
cerns engaged in work on a large number of federal government
contracts. The purpose of this note is to discuss in general the
major federal statutes which govern rights of employees of those
performing government contracts and to discuss in detail the penalties
which may be applicable to the contractor-employer in violation of
one of these statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
The unemployment and low wages of the depression era prompted
Congress to use the purchasing power of the federal government as
a weapon to combat "sweat shop conditions." One method employed
was to enact laws regulating the wages of employees and working
conditions on certain federal contracts.2 Prior to the passage of these
statutes, which were applicable to almost all federal contracts, the
government bad been in the somewhat anomalous position of urging
the improvement of labor conditions on the one hand, and yet re-
quiring its own contracts to be awarded to the lowest bidder.3 Earlier
governmental attempts to regulate labor standards had been confined
to the problem of compensation for overtime work. These statutes
have become known cumulatively as the Eight Hour Law.4 The
earliest of these, enacted in 1892, absolutely prohibited work in
excess of eight hours per day on government contracts. Later statutes
removed this prohibition but imposed the requirement that work in
excess of eight hours a day be compensated for at one and a half times
the basic rate of pay.
1. In 1950, the United States government spent $20,000,000,000 in purchasing goods
and services. It is estimated that this figure for 1964 will exceed $68,000,000,000.
STATISTiCAL ABsTRAcT OF T11E UNI Eu STATES 389, Chart No. 511 (1963).
2. 1 LYON, WATKnS & ABRAmSON, GOVERNMENT & ECONOMIC LirE Chap. XVII,
§ IV (1939); See Donahue, The Davis-Bacon Act and the Walsh-Healey Public Con-
tracts Act: A Comparison of Coverage and Minimum Wage Provisions, 29 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1964).
3. REv. STAT. § 3721 (1885), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 1-1.301 (1964).
4. 27 Stat. 340 (1892); 37 Stat. 347 (1912); 37 Stat. 726 (1913); 39 Stat. 1192
(1917); 54 Stat. 884 (1940); 62 Stat. (1948); 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (1964).
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In seeking to alleviate the effects of the depression Congress im-
posed more inclusive control over the labor standards of employers who
contracted with the government. The Davis-Bacon Act, which applies
to construction contracts, was passed in 1931.5 The main thrust of this
act was to require employers to pay the prevailing wages to laborers
and mechanics working on federal contracts for the construction,
alteration, and repair of public works. Another act passed to combat
the effect of the depression was the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts
Act6 which became effective in 1936. It set labor standards for supply
contracts similar to those which Davis-Bacon set for construction
contracts. To prevent employees from being pressured into repaying
their employers for any part of their wages earned on construction
contracts, the Copeland Act,7 popularly known as the Anti-Kickback
Act, was enacted in 1934.
The Work-Hours Act of 1962,8 as the date reveals, was not con-
cerned with the depression, but it too was passed to insure that the
federal government could use its purchasing power to provide for
reasonable wages. Other federal statutes which dealt with overtime
on public works contracts were replaced by the Wage-Hours Act's
provision for payment of time and one-half for overtime work on
such contracts.
III. THE WALsH-HEALEY Acr
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act applies to all federal con-
tracts exceeding 10,000 dollars for the manufacture or furnishing of
materials, supplies, articles or equipment.9 The act requires that, in
any federal government contract, provisions must be included which
require the contractor to "pay not less than the minimum wages as
determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum
wages" 10 for similar work done by industries currently operating in the
locality; to pay overtime at time and one-half the basic hourly wage for
hours worked in excess of eight daily or forty weekly;" not to
employ convicts or underage persons;12 nor to perform any part of
the contract under working conditions which are unsanitary or
dangerous to the health or safety of his employees. 13 This act and
5. Act of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) 1-7 (1964).
6. Act of June 30, 1936, 49 Stat. 2036-39, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
7. Act of June 1934, 48 Stat. 948, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1964).
8. Act of August 13, 1962, 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (1964).
9. Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1964). The act also
applies to the construction, alteration, furnishing, or equiping of naval vessels. 52
Stat. 403 (1938), 10 U.S.C. § 7299 (1964).
10. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1964).
11. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35(c) (1964).
12. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35(d) (1964).
13. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1964).
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the Fair Labor Standards Act, which sets a minimum wage and
regulates conditions of employment on work affecting interstate com-
merce, are not mutually exclusive. Thus, in any case where products
move in interstate commerce, the employer cannot pay less than the
federally established minimum wage. Some persons believe that
there is no longer any need for Walsh-Healey and advocate its repeal,
leaving regulation of government contracts to the FLSA.14
The constitutionality of the Walsh-Healey Act was upheld soon
after its enactment. In 1940, several steel companies sought to enjoin
the Secretary of Labor and subordinate government purchasing agents
from continuing in effect a wage determination made by the Secretary
for that industry. The companies' complaint was that in order
to bid on government contracts they were required to abide by this
allegedly arbitrary, capricious, and unauthorized action and as a
result, would suffer irreparable loss and damage. In holding that
the complainants had no standing to bring the suit as none of their
legal rights were violated, the Supreme Court foreclosed the consti-
tutional question by saying,
Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the un-
restricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom
it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases . ... 15 P]rospective bidders for contracts derive no
enforceable rights against the agent for an erroneous interpretation of the
principal's authorization.16
Congress felt that although this decision was constitutionally correct,
it produced harsh results on those persons dealing with the govern-
ment. Therefore, in 1952, section 43a was passed as an amendment to
Walsh Healey, allowing judicial review of wage determinations and
of any legal questions which might arise in dealings with the gov-
erment under Walsh-Healey.' 7 The effect of this amendment is dis-
cussed in detail below.
Rather than considering in detail what actions constitute a breach
for which the contractor will be liable, this article proceeds on the
assumption that a breach has occurred. Accordingly, primary atten-
tion will be focused on the consequences which flow from such a
breach. The Walsh-Healey Act has been chosen for more detailed
treatment as, for purposes of coherent organization, it is necessary to
deal with the various statutes separately. Most of the discussion
14. Note, 31 IN. L.J. 245 (1956).
15. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940).
16. Id. at 129.
17. The legislative history of this amendment, Act of June 30, 1952, 66 Stat. 308,
41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1964), is collected in 98 CONe. Rtc. 6531 (1952).
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regarding liability for breach of Walsh-Healey will be equally appli-
cable to the other statutes.
A. Penalties Under Walsh-Healey
In the event of a breach or violation of any of the regulations in a
contract governed by Walsh-Healey the party responsible is rendered
liable to the United States for all damages flowing from the breach
in addition to the sum of ten dollars per day for each male under
sixteen, each female under eighteen, and each convict knowingly
employed on the contract. The breaching party will also be liable
for a sum equal to the amount of any deductions, rebates, refunds, or
underpayments of wages due to any employee engaged in work under
the contract. The government agency which entered into the contract
has the power to cancel it upon breach, complete it in the open
market by recontracting, and charge any additional cost to the original
contractor. Furthermore, the statute authorizes the contracting agency
to withhold from its contract payments any amount claimed to be
due the government because of the breach of the contract and also
authorizes court actions against the contractors. The sums withheld
or recovered as deductions, rebates, refunds, or underpayments of
wages are held in special accounts to be paid on the order of the
Secretary of Labor directly to the employees who were paid less
than the minimum rates.18 All suits must be brought by the govern-
ment. There is no authorization for employee actions, 19 although
any "interested party"20 may report breaches or violations of the
act to the Wage and Hour and Public Contract Divisions.
A discussion of the administrative and judical procedures in the
order that they are usually applied to a case appears to be the most
efficient method of understanding these provisions. The Secretary
of Labor has delegated the general administration of the Walsh-Healey
Act to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts
Divisions." Upon report of an alleged breach, a formal complaint
stating the charges is issued and served. Notice of a hearing before
a trial examiner designated by the Secretary follows the issuance of
the complaint. The contractor-respondent is given twenty days in
which to file a specific answer denying or admitting each charge.
For each denial the facts relied upon must be stated. If the respondent
admits a charge, but believes there were reasons or circumstances
18. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
19. U.S. v. Lovknit Mfg. Co., 189 F.2d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 1951).
20. "Interested party" should be interpreted liberally. A partial list of those
deemed "interested" are employees, employers, and labor or trade organizations. 41
C.F.R. § 50-203.1 (1964).
21. Ibid.
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warranting special consideration, he may state them in his answer.2
2
Soon after the answer is filed a pre-trial hearing may be held
before the hearing examiner to simplify the issues and make stipula-
tions to expedite the formal hearing.23 The hearing in an average
case takes place within two months after the filing of the complaint,
and there is no default procedure. If the defendant fails to answer
or appear, the government must still present a prima facie case
before the hearing examiner. In certain instances, the defendant may
fail to answer and yet appear at the hearing. The hearing examiner
will still allow such defendants to testify and introduce evidence
in their behalf. The formal hearing is conducted much like any
federal district court nonjury trial with the exception that the rules
of evidence are not controlling.2
The decision and order of the trial examiner embodying his findings
of fact and conclusions of law on all issues as to whether respondent
has violated the act and the amounts due therefor is issued shortly
after the hearing. It becomes final if there is no petition for review.
If the contractor is found guilty, the trial examiner makes a recom-
mendation as to whether he should be relieved from the blacklisting
penalty which results in ineligibility to contract with the government
for a period of three years.25 Within twenty days of the decision any
interested party may ask for review of the decision by the Adminis-
trator. Parties may then file briefs and the Administrator in his dis-
cretion may deny or grant such review and later hand down his de-
cision along with his recommendation concerning blacklisting.2 This
is the final administrative review of the case with the exception of the
blacklisting penalty. As to that decision the contractor may appeal
to the Secretary of Labor.7
If the contractor is found to have breached his contract, the usual
procedure is for the Attorney General to bring suit based upon the
findings of the administrative proceeding in a federal district court.
It is evident, however, that there will be times when enforcement
of the governmental agency's determination will not be sought
through the courts. The blacklisting penalty is the most obvious
example. Another instance is when a contractor feels that the wage
determination with which he must comply in his bid on the contract is
unreasonably high. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.28 held that these
determinations were unreviewable, reasoning, as mentioned earlier,
22. 41 C.F.R. §§ 50-203.2-.3 (1964).
23. 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.7 (1964).
24. 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.8 (1964).
25. 41 C.F.R. § 40-203.10 (1964).
26. 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.11 (1964).
27. 41 C.F.R. § 50-203.11(g) (1964).
28. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
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that the federal government had the unrestricted right to fix the
terms and conditions upon which it would make its purchases.29
Congress, of course, has recognized that harmful results could
result from judicially uncontrolled statutory interpretation and applica-
tion by the Department of Labor. Accordingly, in 1952, the Fulbright
Amendment to the Walsh-Healey Act was enacted to afford any
"interested person" the right to judicial review of many administrative
determinations. 30 This action rendered Perkins impotent in Walsh-
Healey controversies. 31 The interpretation by the Administrator of the
terms "locality," "regular dealer," "manufacturer," and "open market"
are some of the reviewable determinations. 32 Thus, the amendment
replaced the "legal wrong" criterion of Perkins with the standard of
"any interested person." Under the new standard it has been held
that a union representing employees whose wages would be increased
by a wage determination of the Secretary of Labor was an interested
party.33 Similarly, a person threatened with blacklisting for violation
of the act may seek court relief.- If an "interested person" becomes
involved in a dispute arising under a government contract covered
or alleged to be covered by Walsh-Healey, he may exercise his right
to judicial determination of the issue in "any appropriate proceeding."35
Proceedings for declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief have
been held to be appropriate.36
When the Attorney General does file a court action based upon
the administrative findings the district court performs the function of
an appellate court, as it decides only questions of law and whether
the findings underlying the government's complaint are supported
by a preponderance of the evidence.3 The action is not one for
breach of contract, rather it is to enforce the determination of the
Administrator.8 It is obvious that there can be no judgment on the
pleadings as the judge must consider the evidence to determine its
weight.
The usual method used by the government is to move for summary
judgment after presenting the evidence. The defendant must then
29. Ibid.
30. Act of June 1952, 66 Stat. 308, 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1964).
31. Senator Fulbright who sponsored the amendment said, "It is our purpose, by
this amendment, to overturn that [Perkins] decision." 98 CONG. REC. 6531 (1952).
32. Act of June 30, 1952, 66 Stat. 308, 41 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1964).
33. Textile Workers v. Allendal Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
34. George v. Mitchell, 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
35. The quoted words are from the House Conference Report. H.R. CONF. REP.
2352, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952).
36. 282 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Camp-
bell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (suit for a judgment declaring unlawful the
blacklisting of defendant).
37. Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 571 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
38. United States v. Davis, 16 CCH Lab. Cas. 1f 65,095 (N.D. Il. 1949).
1874 [ VOL. 18
prove that the administrative findings are not based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence. If the findings are not so supported a trial
de novo in the district court is available.
In reaching his conclusion as to the amount due from the breach-
ing defendant, the hearing examiner need not support his findings
with great detail.3 The burden is on the employer to inform the
court of the incorrectness of any finding by detailing the evidence
relating to the point. The test to be applied is "that the adequacy
of the findings must be determined with regard to the nature of
the case."40 In Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States,41 the
government was excused from detailing the wage and hour computa-
tions with respect to 249 employees over a five year period. In sup-
port of its decision requiring, the defendant to prove the findings
erroneous, the court said that "If one fears that . . . Governmental
agencies make findings by unauthorized methods, he must remember
that detailed findings, as well as more general findings, could be made
by such methods. It would only take longer to make them."42 In
effect, the burden of proof as to the incorrectness of the agency's
finding is on the contractor.
If the district court rules contrary to an administrative decision,
its decision will not be set aside by a higher court unless "clearly
erroneous."
43
Another procedural consideration is that of the applicable statute
of limitations. Section 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 provides
for a two year limitation on any action commenced on or after the date
of the act "to enforce any cause of action for unpaid minimum wages,
unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under ... the
Walsh-Healey Act or the Bacon-Davis Act." It further provides that
"every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within
two years after the cause of action accrued."44 For some time there
was a conflict in the United States Courts of Appeal as to the proper
application of this statute. There were different holdings on the
questions as to when the statute began to run and what action by
the government would result in its being tolled. The Supreme Court
in Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States,45 settled these issues
by holding that the cause of action accrues when the breach of the
statute occurs. Thus, in regard to child labor violations, the statute
39. See United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 529 (1946).
40. Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, supra note 37, at 579.
41. Supra note 37.
42. Id. at 578.
43. United States v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 178 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1949);
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
44. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1964).
45. 345 U.S. 59 (1953).
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begins to run, in the words of the Court, "when the minors were em-
ployed."4 It would appear to be a better and more logical solution to
regard the employment as a recurring or continuing violation and to
allow the government to recover the liquidated damages of ten dollars
a day for each minor knowingly employed by the contractor within the
two years prior to the filing of the suit. This reasoning is applied
to underpayments of wages (and overtime violations) so that the
statute of limitations runs as to each underpayment, not just the first.
An employer should not be entirely insulated from liability because a
minor working for him at the time of the suit has been continuously
employed by him for over two years. Possibly, due to the rarity of
this situation or the untenability of the court's position, its language
to the effect that the statute begins to run when the minor is employed
has not been judicially tested since this 1953 decision. An injunction
to assure future compliance with the act is often resorted to when
the statute of limitations has run on a violation.
The filing of a complaint in an administrative proceeding does not
toll the statute; only a complaint filed in court will have this effect.4"
Many suits would thus be barred by the statute of limitations if it
were necessary to get a final administrative decision before resorting
to court action. This would be the result if the rule requiring that
administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial process
could be sought were applicable. However, this doctrine of exhaus-
tion applies only to claims which are cognizable in the first instance
by an administrative agency. Under Walsh-Healey the source of the
cause of action is the statute itself, not administrative findings. For
this reason the finding of a violation and the imposition of damages
by an administrative agency. Under Walsh-Healey, the source of the
government to institute and maintain court action for the violation.48
To preserve its rights against employers for violations of the act,
the government often files a court action before an administrative
decision is rendered. As mentioned above, the pendency of adminis-
trative proceedings on the same violations will not toll the statute,
but it is within the sound discretion of the court whether to stay
the court proceedings for a reasonable time to await the administrative
findings of fact.49 Since administrative machinery is available for
an expeditious determination of the facts, it is only in rare instances
that the court will not stay its action until after the administrative
decision is reached.
46. Id. at 65.
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id. at 65; United States v. Winegar, 254 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1958).
49. 254 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Pine Township Coal Co.,
201 F. Supp. 441 (W.D. Pa. 1962). See Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States,
supra note 45, at 66.
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Several other problems have arisen in regard to the Portal-to-
Portal Act's statute of limitations and Walsh-Healey controversies.
The Secretary of Labor has consistently held, with court approval,
that the statute of limitation does not apply to administrative pro-
ceedings. Consequently, if it is not necessary for the government
to seek court action to make an administrative decision effective, a
contractor who violates the act is never freed from the possibility
of certain administrative actions which might be brought against him,
resulting in blacklisting. 0
Furthermore, the blacklisting period dates from the decision of
the Secretary of Labor that the contract was breached, not from the
date of actual violation.51
Another governmental sanction which is never barred by the statute
of limitations is the government's right to withhold contract payments
due a breaching contractor. Usually the government withholds pay-
ments from the time it is determined that the contract has been
breached. The money withheld for wage underpayments is placed in
trust and by express statutory direction is paid directly to the em-
ployees who were wrongfully denied their full emolument.52 In ac-
cordance with the general rule that administrative action is not barred
by the statute of limitations, it was held in Ready Mix Concrete Co. v.
United States53 that this right of withholding remains regardless of the
passage of time. In that case, the court further held that Walsh-
Healey authorized the withholding of amounts from any contract
which the contractor had with the government. The language of the
statute is: "Any sums of money due to the United States of America
by reason of any violation of any of the representations and stipula-
tion of said contract set forth in section 35 of this title may be withheld
from any amounts due on any such contracts .... "m The decided
cases deal with situations where several contracts were in existence
at the same time, but it would not be straining the statute and the
decisions thereunder to apply this rule to contracts made long after
the earlier breach. Thus, a contractor would not be insulated from
this governmental sanction even after he had received full payment
for the contract and the statute had run. If he later enters into a
Walsh-Healey contract with the government, there would appear to
be no bar to the government's withholding of sums from this later
contract and applying these funds to damages administratively found
50. Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. C1. 1955).
51. 7 McBRmE & WACHE, GovR~mErN CONTRACTS, § 45.80 (6) (1964).
52. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
53. Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, supra note 50.
54. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
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to be due under prior Walsh-Healey contracts.5 The validity of the
withholding is usually determined when the contractor sues to
recover the withheld funds. Thus, although the withholding may be
stringent and in opposition to the general policy underlying limitations
of actions, i.e., keeping stale litigation out of the courts, the adminis-
trative action remains subject to the safeguard of judicial review.
One consolation to the contractor is that he may not be sub-
jected to this treatment if his later contracts are not subject to
Walsh-Healey. The Secretary of Labor pressed for this additional
right, but has been denied it by the Court of Claims.56 The statute
clearly limits the withholding right to contracts covered by Walsh-
Healey as the provision for withholding speaks of "such" contracts and
the whole context relates only to contracts covered by Walsh-Healey.57
In summary, it can be said that the withholding provision of section
36 is a codification of the common law doctrine of recoupment extend-
ing the right to withhold beyond the breached contract to other
contracts of the same species. Since the Portal-to-Poral Act's statute
of limitations applies to actions to recover unpaid wages and liqui-
dated damages, and since a time limitation does not apply to common
law recoupment neither does it apply to this statutory recoupment. 8
Another effect of the Portal-to-Portal Act is to provide contractors
the defense of good faith reliance on administrative rulings as to
failure to pay minimum wages and overtime. This, however, does
not apply to child labor violations.59 Employees have sought to
attack this protection given to the employer on the ground that it
deprives them of property and vested rights without due process of
law; but the constitutionality of the statute has been consistently
upheld by the federal courts on the ground that the rights of the
employees were created by statute and thus could be altered by
statute.60 The good faith reliance defense is available where the
contract was admittedly breached, but the breach occurred because
of the contractor's reliance upon a ruling, approval, or interpretation
of a federal agency. Sufficient basis for the defense exists if informa-
tion or counsel of individual employees of such agencies was relied
upon. This means that the employee must have authority to speak
for the agency.61 It is clear that the reliance must be based upon an
55. 130 F. Supp. 390 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States,
149 F. Supp. 383 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
56. Unexcelled Chem. Corp. v. United States, supra note 55.
57. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
58. Supra note 50, at 393.
59. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. § 258-59 (1964).
60. Thomas v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 174 F.2d 711 (3rd Cir. 1949); see
Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1333 (1949).
61, Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 176 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1949).
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applicable ruling as a whole. The contractor cannot excerpt merely
those portions of the ruling which are to his benefit.6 2 The courts
interpret this statute liberally in accord with the congressional intent.
In most cases the only question presented is one of fact, i.e., was
the reliance in good faith and in conformity with a communication
of a federal agency? In deciding this issue the "reasonably prudent
man standard" is used.
63
B. Blacklisting
Of all the penalties which may be incurred for breach of a Walsh-
Healey contract perhaps the most drastic is "blacklisting." This is the
procedure by which a person is barred from contracting with the
government for a period of three years from the date of the Secretary
of Labor's determination that a breach has occurred.6 Most con-
tractors would be financially able to withstand the imposition of
damages for breach of a contract; but for many contractors whose
greatest volume of business is done with the federal government, de-
barment could spell disaster.
It is fortunate that Congress had the foresight to make blacklisting
discretionary with the Secretary of Labor.65 Automatic debarment
following all breaches would indeed result in a penalty which in
many instances would be unnecessary to effectuate the policy of the
act. Under present policies, breaches caused by negligence may
result in debarment, but usually only wilful and continued viola-
tions result in the imposition of the penalty. A review of the adminis-
trative decisions leads one to the general conclusion that a contractor
who honestly attempts to correct the situations which led to the
breach of the statute in order to comply in the future will either
not be placed on the ineligible list or may successfully petition for
removal.6
62. Ibid.
63. Id. at 993. The annotation, supra note 60, is very thorough in regard to actions
under the Fair Labor Standards Acts. Fewer cases have arisen under the Walsh-Healey
Act, but there is every indication that FLSA "reliance" cases under the Portal-to-Portal
Act are good authority in Walsh-Healey controversies.
64. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (1964).
65. Ibid.
66. In the Matter of Shelby Steam Coal Co., Division of Public Contracts, U.S.
Dep't of Labor, No. PC-822 (July 11, 1961), it was recommended that the contractor
be relieved from the blacklisting penalty in view of the fact that he agreed to no
longer deal with suppliers who failed to pay overtime and operated mines which were
hazardous to employees; In the Matter of Louis F. Stana, dibla Stana Mfg. Co.,
Division of Public Contracts, U. S. Dep't of Labor, No. PC-850 (Dec. 1, 1961), relief
from blacklisting was recommended when the 19 unsafe and hazardous conditions
complained of were corrected and the company gave assurances of institution of a
continuing program to insure compliance with the health and safety standards of the
Department of Labor. To the same effect is Matter of Kamer Soap Products Co.,
Division of Public Contracts, U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. PC-842 (March 22, 1962),
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Paisner v. United States,67 a Court of Claims case, involved the
important question of the amount recoverable from a blacklisted con-
tractor if he, in some manner, succeeded in obtaining a government
contract. The statute requires the Secretary of Labor to furnish the
Comptroller General the names of firms and their owners who are
ineligible to contract with the government.68 No contracts are to
be awarded to such designees or to any firms controlled by the con-
tractor on the list.69 In Paisner, the blacklisted partnership changed
its name and, through a failure of the agency to check the names
of the partners, was later able to bid successfully on three contracts.
After the firm completed two of the contracts and was paid therefor,
the deception was discovered and the government cancelled the
third contract as void ab initio, refusing to make any payments there-
under or return the already delivered goods. The unfinished portion
of the contract was relet at a greater cost. The partnership brought
suit to recover the contract price of the delivered goods and the
profits which it lost on the balance of the contract. The Government
counterclaimed for the damages in reletting the third contract and
for the total amount paid under the first two contracts.
The court held that the government could recover all the profits
earned by the contractor plus the damages sustained in the reletting
of the third contract. The decision is equitable as the policy of Walsh-
Healey will be upheld as long as a debarred contractor can make no
profits on his fraudulently obtained contract. However, aside from the
fairness of the decision, it appears that the contractor was fortunate
to lose only his profits and the reletting damages, for the majority
failed to comment on two statutes which seem to be directly con-
trolling and which would appear to call for more stringent treatment.
One is the forfeiture statute which provides: "A claim against the
United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who
corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the
United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance
where a hearing was adjourned for 90 days to allow the employer to correct the
violations, and evidence revealed that he had made many expensive improvements in
the plant, adopted suggestions of safety engineers, retained an engineering firm to
study soap dust problem, and indicated a sincere desire to comply with the Act in
the future. But see Matter of J. B. Mfg. Co., Division of Public Contracts, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, No. PC-863 (April 25, 1962), since unsafe conditions existed at the time
of the hearing and the record strongly suggested that the contractor had not exercised
the diligence and care required to comply with applicable safety regulations. The
Hearing Examiner expressed doubt as to whether the employer could be relied upon
in the future to comply with the Act.
67. 150 F. Supp. 835 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). For a
discussion of this case see 43 CORNELL L.Q. 503 (1958), and 57 COLUm. L. REv.
1185 (1957).
68. 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 37 (1964).
69. Ibid.
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thereof."70 The dissenting judge felt this statute should prevent any
recovery for the amount due on the third contract, but should not
apply to the claims already paid. He reasoned that the statute did
not apply to claims already paid for the simple reason that after
payment there is no claim to be forfeited.71 This reasoning is correct
but it appears that the False Claims Act 72 would apply even to the
contracts under which payment was completed. That statute provides
that anyone who knowingly presents a "false, ficticious, or fraudulent
claim" to the United States shall be liable in the amount of two
thousand dollars for each claim so presented, plus double the amount
of actual damage sustained by the government. The act has been held
to apply to claims valid on their face arising from contracts which,
but for the concealment of pertinent data by the contractor, would
not have been awarded to him.73 The Paisner case seems to fall
squarely within the act's provisions.
There is no explanation by the majority why these statutes did
not apply to the defendants in Paisner. It appears that the court
simply felt that the denial of profits to the blacklisted contractors
would be adequate punishment for their fraud.74 In the future, if the
government presses its rights under these statutes, this judicial excep-
tion to the forfeiture statute and the False Claims Act will probably
be small solace to contractors. In any case, under existing law the
most a blacklisted contractor can recover on a contract is his cost;
thus, he will have no incentive to obtain government contracts
unless he needs volume to meet fixed overhead costs or to rid himself
of unwanted inventory. One other deterrent to such action is the
possibility of criminal prosecution. It is a federal crime to present
false claims,75 to attempt to defraud the federal government,76 or
to wilfully misstate material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction
of a government agency."
7
C. Non-Signatory Liability
Once a violation of the statute is determined the important question
arises as to who is liable for damages. Clearly, the signatories of the
contract are liable for their company's violations; but in many cases
the government seeks to impose joint and several liability on non-
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1958).
71. 150 F. Supp. at 839 (dissenting opinion). See F. B. Crano Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 100 Ct. Cl. 368 (1943).
72. Rev. Stat. § 3490 (1875), 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235 (1958).
73. United States v. Johnston, 138 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
74. 150 F. Supp. at 838.
75. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 698, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1964).
76. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 698, 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1964).
77. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 749, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
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signatories as well, generally officers of the contracting companies. The
act provides: "Any breach or violation of any of the representations
and stipulations in any contract for the purposes set forth in section
35 of this title shall render the party responsible therefor liable...."7 8
Some early cases held the active managing directors of corporations
individually liable as "parties responsible" for the breach.7 9 However,
this interpretation of the "party responsible" has not been followed by
other courts. In United States v. Hudgins-Dize,80 the court said,
"The statute plays on contracts exclusively. In that setting 'party'
is a word of art. It can refer only to a promisor or covenantor in the
instrument." However, one should not be misled by this statement
into concluding that only the signatory of a Walsh-Healey contract
can be made to respond for damages assessed for its breach. Under
several judicial theories officers, managers, and directors of corpora-
tions have been held jointly and severally liable with the contracting
corporation. In certain cases the courts will pierce the corporate veil
or regard the corporation as the alter ego or agent of an individual in
order to hold him individually responsible. In United States v. Islip
Machine Works, Inc. the court said,
While the defendant Kent did not individually sign the contract the un-
contradicted evidence indicates that he as president in all respects had
exclusive control of the corporation by stock ownership and otherwise and
that he hired and fired and was the 'boss'. In reality the corporation was
his alter ego or agent. . . . The Court rests its judgment upon the theory
that the corporation and Kent were one and the same, and as contracting
parties should be held jointly and severally responsible.81
However, the corporate fiction is not perfunctorily disregarded by
the courts to hold managers of corporations liable. Persons who
loaned money to the corporation and obtained some rights of super-
vision and inspection have not been held liable when a Walsh-Healey
contract was violated.
In United States v. Hudgins-Dize, lenders agreed to finance a com-
pany's two remaining contracts with the government as the company
was unable to raise money through institutional lenders. The court
78. 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 36 (1958) (Emphasis added).
79. United States v. Hedstram, 15 CGH Lab. Gas. ff 64, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (failure
to pay overtime); United States v. A-AN-E Mfg. Co., 15 CCH Lab. Cas. f[ 64, 621
(N.D. Ill. 1948).
80. 83 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D. Va. 1949). See also United States v. Sawyer
Finels, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. 1961); United States v. Islip Mach.
Workers, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 585, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). See United States v. Old
Dominion Mfg. Co., 16 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 65,193 (E.D. Va. 1949), wherein it was
stated that "the Statute does, not authorize the imposition of liability upon any person
not a party to the contract .. " Id. at 75,746.
81. United States v. Islip Mach. Workers, Inc., supra note 80, at 588-90.
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held the lenders not responsible for violations of the act although they
reserved to themselves not only the right to inspect the records and work,
but also to protect the security of their loan by requiring the company to
follow such orders and instructions, and take such steps and measures, as
might be necessary to restore the workmanship and progress of the produc-
tion under the contracts to a satisfactory state, whenever it was found that
the company was not being capably managed or the work efficiently
performed.
82
In this decision, the court may have been influenced by the fact that
the only major action taken by the lenders with respect to the opera-
tions of the corporation was their insistence upon the replacement of
a superintendent. If the lenders had exercised more of their rights
under the contract, a different result would not have been unrea-
sonable.
If the corporate form is not used "fraudulently and illegally," the per-
sonnel of the corporation will be free from personal liability.P Thus,
in a case involving the employment of minors by a bookkeeper only
the corporation was held responsible.P
Another theory sometimes used is that the director or officer in-
duced the corporation to breach the contract.85 The general principle
is that a third party who induces a breach of contract is liable to the
injured party.86 Thus, judgment might be entered against the corpo-
ration for breach of contract, and against the individual for inducing
the breach. No caseshave been found in which the court has actually
held the personnel of a corporation liable on the. theory of induce-
ment. The possible use of this theory has been suggested by way of
dicta, but since the cases usually involve officers who own as well as
manage the corporation, the courts have simply applied the more
familiar theory of ignoring the corporate entity.
Similarly, the problem may arise where one corporation is sought to
82. 83 F. Supp. at 599.
83. United States v. Old Dominion Mfg. Co., supra note 80. The court stated, "the
statute does not authorize the imposition of liability upon any person not a party to
the contract, and the evidence does not justify a finding that the corporate fiction of the
contracting party was used fraudulently or illegally, so as to warrant a judgment against
the personnel of the corporation." Perhaps the court saw no reason in this case to
hold the officers liable as there were sureties on the contract which insured that the
government would collect on its judgment.
84. United States v. B. & W. Sportswear, Inc., 17 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 65,295
(E.D.N.Y. 1949). The cited case indicates that the officers of the corporation left the
hiring of workers to lower echelon employees. The court stated, "[A]bsent a showing
of personal participation . . [the officers] would surely not be vicariously responsible
in their individual capacity for the acts of the servants of the corporation, only the
corporation would have to answer for these." Id. at 76,110.
85. United States v. Old Dominion Mfg. Co., supra note 80, at 590-91.
86. RESTATEMENT, TortTs § 766 (1939).
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be held responsible although it did not bid on or obtain the contract
from the government. The simplest situation is when a dealer obtains
the contract and then causes a manufacturer to deliver directly to
the government the called for goods. Article 104 of the Walsh-Healey
regulations deals expressly with this situation and declares the dealer
to be the agent of the manufacturer.87 The manufacturer as the
principal is deemed to have agreed to the stipulations contained in
the contract and is, therefore, subject to liability under the act.
This regulation has been given the force of law by the courts.88
A related question concerns the liability of the contracting firm
when one of its suppliers does not conform to Walsh-Healey standards.
In United States v. New England Coal & Coke Co.,89 the court held
that the act does not make a regular dealer responsible for the labor
standards of its suppliers. This case in no manner lessens the authority
of the direct shipment exception of the regulations and case men-
tioned above. In New England, the dealer bought coal and then
delivered it to the government itself. The cases may be easily dis-
tinguished on the fact of direct shipment. The issue likely to arise
in the future is how much control the contracting dealer must exercise
over the goods before they go to the buying agency. Would labeling,
packaging, or sorting by the dealer relieve him from liability under
the direct shipment rule? Since the Secretary of Labor has ruled
that the principal contractor will not be held liable as an agent of his
supplier if the goods are merely added to his stock, such a result is
entirely possible 0 However, a related and unanswered question arises
when the goods are merely held at the dealer's place of business while
in transit to the government. Finally, it may be said that the courts
have had no difficulty in imposing liability for the breach on the part
of the contractor's suretyf1
The Secretary of Labor has ruled that if a manufacturer contracts
with the government to furnish commodities and then subcontracts
out the work, the subcontractor does not have to produce the material
subject to the Walsh-Healey Act if such subcontracting is the "regular
practice in the industry." 2 The problem, of course, is determining
87. 41 C.F.R. § 50-201.104 (1964).
88. United States v. Standard Pharmacel Co., 17 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 65,460 (N.D.
Ill. 1949).
89. 318 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1963).
90. "Section 50-201.104 does not apply if the manufacturer ships the goods to the
warehouse or other establishment of the regular dealer and the dealer puts the goods
in his regular stock, even though the Government contract is filled from that stock."
WA-r.I-HALFY PUn. CONTRACTS Acr, Ru rNcs AN INTmiRErATIONS No. 3, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABoR §§ 34(c) (May 31, 1963) [hereinafter cited as RULncs AND INTERPRETA-
TIONS No. 3].
91. United States v. Old Dominion Mfg. Co., supra note 80.
92. Rurmcs AND INTERPRAwIONs No. 3 § 30.
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what constitutes the regular practice in the industry. This ruling by
the Secretary of Labor is mentioned because of its obvious importance
but little can be said of it because the issue has not been litigated.
One way in which a manufacturer may furnish goods to the govern-
ment and yet not be subject to Walsh-Healey is by the use of a stock-
pile. The act does not apply retroactively to work performed before
the award of the contractf 3 The contractor may fill the contract from
finished goods in his stockpile and the act will only apply to employees
who remove articles from the stock or those who perform any
subsequent work such as further processing of the goods, or inspecting,
labeling, packing or crating the finished articles.94 Usually, the manu-
facturer has a stockpile on hand at the time of the award of the
contract, and during the performance of the contract produces goods
of the same kind which are added to the stockpile and commingled
with them so as to be unidentifiable from the existing stock previously
on hand. If all of the following factors are present during the per-
formance of the contract, the Secretary of Labor has ruled that those
employees engaged in such additional production are not covered
by the act: (1) The contractor must customarily maintain a stockpile
of materials which are unidentifiable as to the time work was per-
formed on any particular unit in the pile; (2) such a stockpile, at
the time of the award of the contract and at all times before the
contract is completed, must be sufficient to fulfill the remaining
demands under the government contract; and (3) the contract must
be in fact filled from that stock pile.95 If the goods added to the pile
are identifiable as having been produced after the date of the contract
and furnished to the government, then employees engaged in their
production would be covered by the act. This regulation is a boon
to many manufacturers but it appears that this is only because the
Government has not stringently attempted to enforce the requirement
that the goods added to the pile must not be identifiable as having
been produced after the date of the contract. The government could
reasonably maintain that the coal, sand, or gravel taken from the
top of a pile or that the machinery or automobiles with the highest
serial numbers were the last produced.
This concludes the discussion of the Walsh-Healey Act which
governs federal supply contracts. The statutes considered below deal
exclusively with federal contracts involving the construction or repair
of public works.
93. RULINs AND INTERPRETAIoNs No. 3 § 24(a).
94. RULINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS No. 3 § 24(d).
95. RULINGS AND INTERPlREA o Os No. 3 § 24(b).
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IV. THE DAVIS-BACON AcT
Government contracts for the construction, alteration, and repair
of public buildings or public works, when in excess of 2,000 dollars,
are subject to the Davis-Bacon Act only if laborers or mechanics are
employed on the project. The statute provides that every such con-
tract must contain a stipulation that all laborers and mechanics
employed directly on the site of the work will be paid not less than
the prevailing wages in that locality as determined by the Secretary
of Labor. The statute further requires that employees be paid at
least once a week. 6 Since the act applies only to laborers and
mechanics employed directly on the work site, the problem associated
with the interpretation of coverage is minimal. The Comptroller
General has held that this statute applies only to contracts to which
the United States is a party. It does not apply to federally assisted
construction work.97 The statute specifically provides that a clause
must be included in the contract incorporating the requirements of
the act."' If the stipulations are not included in the contract, whether
properly or improperly, the act is not binding on the contractor.0
Section 276(a)-2 grants the Secretary of Labor the power, in his
discretion, to debar a contractor who has violated the act from con-
tracting with the government for three years. The Secretary has
established the Wage Appeals Board to review determinations made
by the contracting agencies in the administration and enforcement
of Davis-Bacon.100 Detailed regulations have been promulgated to
govern the procedure to be followed before this Board.1"' Following
a Board decision imposing monetary liability for failure to pay the
prevailing wages, the courts may be presented the issue in one of
two ways. If payments of funds have been withheld from the con-
tractor pursuant to section 276(a) of the act, the contractor may sue
the government for their recovery. If payments were not withheld,
the government may sue the contractor basing its case on the
administrative finding.
In some instances the availability of judicial review of administra-
tive determinations under this act has not been clear. It has now
96. Davis-Bacon Act, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a)-(a)l
(1964).
97. Op. Comnp. GEN., B-150223 (Dec. 3, 1962) (unpublished). See 7 McBmD &
WACHTEL, GOVERNXIENT CONTRACTS § 45.50/2/ (1964).
98. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1964).
99. 40 Decs. Comp. Gen. 565, 570 (1961).
100. 29 Fed. Reg. 118 (1963).
101. 2 C.F.R. §§ 7.1-15 (Supp. 1965) "The Davis-Bacon Act requires the Secretary
of Labor to prescribe appropriate standards, regulations, and procedures for the enforce-
ment of the statute and leaves to the contracting agencies the actual administration and
enforcement." 7 McBm. & WACHTEL, op. cit. supra note 97, § 45.50(8).
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been settled by the Supreme Court, however, that the correctness
of the Secretary of Labor's determination of prevailing wage rates is
not subject to judicial review. The Court reasoned that the United
States Government may set its own terms upon which it will con-
tract.1
02
A question on which the Court has not ruled is whether a blacklisted
contractor has standing to seek judicial review of his debarment. In
1961, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided that blacklisted contractors did have such standing. 0 3 The
issue arose under the Eight Hour Laws'04 dealing with overtime com-
pensation under federal contracts, but the decision should be good
authority for the same issue arising under Davis-Bacon. The problem
exists because of the doctrine that only one suffering a legal wrong
may seek access to the courts in the absence of a statute granting such
judicial determination. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Corp.05 authoritatively
decided that persons have no right to receive government contracts;
thus, no legal wrong issuffered by them when the government requires
certain conditions to be met by all who contract with it. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in holding that a blacklisted
contractor had standing to seek judicial review of the administrative
action of debarment, necessarily conceded that persons have no right
to receive government contracts on their own terms; but it asserted
that a right does exist "not to be invalidly denied equal opportunity
under applicable law to seek contracts on government projects. If
deprived of this right they suffer a 'legal wrong' which gives them
access to the courts .... 106 Due to the severe consequences that
might befall a contractor who is denied the right to contract with
the government for three years, this decision was indeed wise. Other
than the burden of requiring the government to litigate these black-
listing issues there is no overriding reason for denying a debarred
contractor judicial review. In Perkins the Court pointed out that the
lower court's injunction against the enforcement of the prevailing
wage determinations had rendered inoperative for longer than a year
the minimum wage provision of the Walsh-Healey Act. The Court, in
denying judicial review of the wage determinations, gave as one of
102. United States v. Binghamton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 177 (1954).
103. Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
104. 37 Stat. 137 (1912), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-26 (1964).
105. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
106. 290 F.2d at 371. Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964), codifies the common law to the effect that "any
person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action . . . shall be entitled to
judicial review thereof." This is subject to the exceptions of when statutes preclude
judicial review an agency action is by law committed to agency discretion; See Note,
56 Nw. U.L. REv. 811 (1962).
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its reasons the necessity of preventing the purchasing machinery of
the government from being hampered by the delays which are
incident to judicial action.107 This consideration is inapplicable in
the case of a debarred contractor, as the pendency of the case in-
volving his blacklisting will in no way prevent the government from
continuing its contracting with others.108
Since the penalty blacklisting is discretionary and not lightly
imposed, it is less likely to be a recurring problem than the issue of
monetary liability which befalls all contractors who breach the
stipulations of a contract subject to Davis-Bacon. All such contracts
include the provision that the Comptroller General may withhold as
much of the accrued payments due under the contract as is necessary
in order to pay laborers and mechanics employed on the project the
difference between the required rates and those actually paid. 00
The statute authorizes withholding only from payments due under the
contract governing the project that the laborer or mechanic is working
on. For that reason, the problem of governmental withholding from
other Davis-Bacon contracts has not arisen. If the accrued payments
withheld are insufficient to reimburse fully all of the wrongfully
underpaid laborers and mechanics, section 276(a)-2(b) confers upon
them the right of action or intervention against the contractor or his
sureties. This section further provides that it shall be no defense
to such a suit that such laborers and mechanics accepted or agreed
to accept less than the required rates or voluntarily made refunds.110
It has been held that a release executed by a laborer subject to the
protection of Davis-Bacon who has been paid a wage less than
the prevailing wage is null and void. 1'
A powerful weapon given the government by section 276(a)1 of
the act is the power to terminate a contractor's right to proceed with
the contract, to prosecute the work to completion, and then charge
any excess cost to the contractor or his sureties. It should be noted
that there is always a surety in the picture on a Davis-Bacon covered
project due to the requirements of the Miller (Heard) Act." 2 It
appears that the government has not exercised to any great extent its
power to terminate Davis-Bacon contracts. The difficulties and loss
of time inherent in termination and the later completion of these
contracts may be secondary reasons why the government does not
107. 310 U.S. 113 at 130.
108. Note, supra note 106, at 822.
109. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1964).
110. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a)-2(b) (1964).
111. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 651 (1939); United States ex rcl.
Johnson v. Morley Constr. Co., 98 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1938).
112. Act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 793, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270z-e (1964).
[ VOL. 181888
NOTES
vigorously assert this power. The primary reason would seem to be
that the presence of sureties on the contracts eliminates any danger
that the funds to pay the employees cannot be recovered. One case
where the contract was terminated involved the actions of a sub-
contractor who had failed to pay his workers the statutory wage and
had not maintained payroll records. The principal contractor argued
to no avail that he was not responsible for the breaches of the contract
by the subcontractor. The Wage Appeals Board held that "[t]o
relieve appellant, the prime contractor, of its responsibility pertaining
to labor provisions of the contract even though the violations were
those of its subcontractor would defeat the purpose of labor legis-
lation .. ."113
A stipulation in all Davis-Bacon contracts unequivocally requires
preservation of payroll records and submission each week of certified
copies thereof to the contracting officer.1 4 Without any records
available the government could not readily determine the amounts
due employees. Perhaps this failure to maintain records with its
attendant hampering of the government's enforcement of the act was
the main consideration leading to the termination of the contract.
In conclusion, it may be said that draftsmen of the Davis-Bacon
Act did a commendable job. Its clarity has forestalled any need for
frequent litigation in regard to breaches of the covered contracts.
The most troublesome problem arising under the act has been the
specification of the prevailing wage determinations in the contracts.
Often contractors have found that labor was not available at the
specified rate and have attempted to hold the government liable for
the higher wage rates which it was necessary to pay to complete the
contract. Generally, the contractors have been denied recovery on
the ground that the specified wage rates did not guarantee that
the contractor would not have to pay more.1 5 Exceptions to this
general conclusion have been recognized, however. Recovery has
been allowed where the contracting agency ordered the employer to
pay the higher rates,116 and where the government affirmatively mis-
represented the wage situation in the area." 7 A detailed analysis of
this problem is beyond the scope of this discussion, but an excellent
treatment may be found in the work on government contracts by
Messrs. McBride and Wachtel." 8
113. Appeal of Kenmel, Inc., ASBCA 3467, 59-1 BCA 2235 (1959).
114. 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(3)(ii) (1964).
115. 347 U.S. 171 (1954).
116. Irvin & Leighton v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 18 (1949); Winn-Senter Constr.
Co. v. United States, 110 Ct. C1. 34 (1948).
117. Albert & Harrison, Inc. v. United States, 107 Ct. CI. 292 (1946).
118. 7 McBImF. & WAcrrrEL, op. cit. supra note 97, §§ 45-60-4.60/121.
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The next statute to be considered is one which was enacted to
complement the federal contract construction acts which contain no
provisions for overtime work. This act supplies both overtime stand-
ards and the penalties for their breach for other acts which have no
provisions regarding overtime, Davis-Bacon being the most obvious
example.
V. WoRKx HouRs STANDARDs ACT OF 1962
In 1892, Congress passed the first legislation regulating overtime
work on government contracts.119 This act was criminal in nature and
required proof of an intent to violate its provisions before a conviction
could stand. The desire to offer wider protection to employees on
federal contracts led Congress to enact a non-criminal statute which
provided for liquidated damages of five dollars for every day that each
laborer and mechanic worked over eight hours. 120 As originally
enacted, the prohibition against overtime work was absolute; but
during World War I Congress suspended the act to allow overtime
work, subject to the requirement that such work be compensated for
at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate.' 2' In 1940, the
absolute prohibition was removed in its entirety to allow laborers and
mechanics to work overtime so long as they were paid at least time
and one-half. 22 To collect the various federal laws regarding over-
time into one act and to make some needed revisions, Congress passed
the Work Hours Standards Act of 1962.123 All previous overtime legis-
lation was expressly repealed by this act. Only those contracts existing
on or before October 12, 1962, the effective date of the Work Hours
Act of 1962, or those that were entered into pursuant to invitations for
bids outstanding on August 13, 1962, the date the Work Hours Act
was enacted, remain subject to the older acts and are excepted from
the coverage of the new act.
The act applies to all laborers, mechanics, watchmen and guards
employed by the government or by any contractor or subcontractor
upon a public works project of the United States.2 4 The act requires
that all covered employees be compensated at a rate not less than one
and one-half times their basic rates for all hours worked in excess
of eight hours in any day, or in excess of forty hours in the workweek.
The act is drafted to cover contracts for work financed in whole or in
119. Act of Aug. 1, 1893, 27 Stat. 340, 40 U.S.C. § 321-2 (1964).
120. Act of June 19, 1912, 37 Stat. 137, 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-25 (1964).
121. Act of March 4, 1917, 39 Stat. 1192, 40 U.S.C. § 326 (1964).
122. Act of Sept. 9, 1940, 54 Stat. 884, 40 U.S.C. § 325a (1964).
123. Act of Aug. 13, 1962, 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 327-32 (1964).
124. 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 3329 (1964). The act also applies to persons who
perform services similar to those of a laborer or mechanic in connection with dredging
or rock excavation in any river or harbor of the United States.
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part by loans or grants from the United States when the contracted
work is included within the coverage of any United States statute
providing wage standards for such projects. However, if financial
assistance is composed solely of loan guarantees or of insurance, the
act does not apply.'25 Neither does it apply to any contracts covered
by the Walsh-Healey Act, as that act contains its own provisions
relating to overtime.
Section 102(b) deals with the penalties for violation of the act.
It provides that any, contractor or subcontractor subject to the act
shall be liable to the United States for liquidated damages of ten
dollars a day for every day that each employee worked overtime
without receiving the required overtime wages. This section goes
further and grants the contracting agency the right to withhold from
accrued payments such sums as may administratively be determined
to be necessary to satisfy any liabilities of the contractor or subcon-
tractor for unpaid wages or liquidated damages.
If an employer fails to pay the required overtime wages, he is
liable to his employees for such unpaid sums. If the agency with-
holds payments from the contractor, the Comptroller General is
authorized to pay directly the sums due to the employees. If the
funds withheld are inadequate to pay the entire amount due, the
employer pays an equitable proportion to each worker.126 The em-
ployees may sue the contractor and his sureties for any unpaid
amounts that the government does not allot them from withheld pay-
ments. 12 17 In such a suit, it is no defense. that the workers accepted
or agreed to accept less than the required rate of wages or voluntarily
made refunds.
Any contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by the withholding of
a sum as liquidated damages is granted the right to appeal, within
sixty days, to the head of the contracting agency. Such agency head
has authority to review the administrative determination of liquidated
damages and to either affirm it; or if it is found that the sum withheld
is incorrect or that the contractor violated the provisions of the act
inadvertantly, notwithstanding his exercise of due care, recommenda-
tions may be made to the Secretary of Labor that an appropriate
adjustment in liquidated damages be made, or that the contractor be
relieved of liability from any liquidated damages. The Secretary
reviews the recommendation, conducts any investigation that he deems
proper and then renders his decision. If the contractor wishes to
appeal this decision he may, within sixty days, file a claim in the
125. 76 Stat. 357,40 U.S.C. § 329 (1964).
126. 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1964).
127. 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 330(b) (1964).
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court of claims. In that court the administrative findings of fact are
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.'2
One of the most noteworthy portions of this act is its provision for
criminal violations. Intentional violations are misdemeanors for which
contractors or subcontractors may be punished by fines up to one
thousand dollars and six months imprisonment.
129
The act itself does not grant the Secretary of Labor authority to
debar a contractor found to be in violation of the act, but regulations
do prescribe such action. 130 The regulations gain the force of law
from Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950131 which authorized their
issuance by the Secretary. It has been held that a contractor black-
listed under the authority of regulations issued in accordance with
the Reorganization Plan has standing to seek judicial review of the
administrative action.1
32
VI. THE COPELAND Acr
To prevent the circumvention of statutes requiring certain wages
to be paid to employees performing work on federal construction
contracts, Congress enacted the Copeland Anti-Kickback Act.133 It
provides criminal penalties.for whoever by force, intimidation, threat
of procuring dismissal or by any other means induces any person
employed in the construction, prosecution, completion, or repair of
any public building or public work financed in whole or in part by
loans or grants from the United States, to give up any part of the
compensation to which he is entitled under his employment contract.
Persons found guilty may be fined not more than five thousand dollars
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
The act in its entirety is composed of only one brief section.
However, the Secretary of Labor has been granted authority to make
reasonable regulations to aid in its enforcement. 1m The regulations
define the scope of the act to include any contract for the construction
or repair of any federally financed public building or public work
which is subject to federal wage standards.'5 If federal assistance
is limited to loan guarantees or insurance the act does not apply.13
128. 76 Stat. 357,40 U.S.C. § 330(e) (1964).
129. 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 95-5.6(b) 1 (1964).
131. Reorg. Plan No. 14 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3176 (1950), adopted under
authority of the Organization Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 203, U.S.C. § 1332-2-15 (1964).
132. Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, supra note 103.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1964).
134. Act of June 13, 1934, 58 Stat. 948, 40 U.S.C. § 276(c) (1964).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1964).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 3.2(d) (1964).
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The primary thrust of the statute is to aid in the enforcement of the
minimum wage provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act and the overtime
provisions of the Work Hours Act of 1962. Several payroll deductions
are permissible under the act. These include the withholding of
federal income taxes, social security taxes, deductions required by
court process, employee contributions to pension and insurance
funds, union dues, initiation fees, and miscellaneous other deduc-
tions.137 Further, the weekly submission of a statement by the em-
ployer of the wages paid the preceding week to each laborer and
mechanic is mandatory.13
The offense which the statute is designed to remedy is the com-
pelling of a workman to give up part of his contract wages in order
to obtain or remain on a job.'39 In United States v. Charlick,140
it was held that an employer who required workmen to return part
of the wages stipulated in the contract was not liable as the workers'
contracts of employment provided that such "kickbacks" were per-
missible. In that case the employees had agreed to a scheme.whereby
the employer was to pay them the stipulated wage in the federal con-
tract under the scrutiny of the inspector, and they were to return part
of this wage. The court reasoned that the Copeland Act was not
intended to punish the refusal or failure of an employer to pay his
men the wages stipulated for in his contract with the govermnnt. The
court held that the workers were not parties to this contract, and that
they had not given up anything to which they were entitled under
their contracts of employment. The bothersome point of this decision
is that it offers a simple method for employers to evade the Copeland
Act. Under the reasoning of this opinion there can be no criminal
liability imposed on a contractor if he makes secret agreements with
his workers whereby they voluntarily return to him part of their
wages. Perhaps the possibility of civil liability, termination of the
contract, and blacklisting afford the government sufficierit tools to
protect the workers' interest, but since Congress has expressed its
desire, and presumably the need, for a criminal sanction, it seems
ludicrous to allow this criminal statute to be flouted by such a
simple subterfuge.
Litigation in regard to this statute has involved primarily the issue
of whose actions are subject to the act. The Supreme Court has
applied a broad interpretation of the statute to uphold the convic-
tion of persons other than employers who induce employees to give
137. 29 C.F.R. § 3.5(a)-(i) (1964).
138. Act of June 13, 1934, 48 Stat. 948, 40 U.S.C. § 27(c) (1964).
139. United States v. Charlick, 26 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
140. Ibid.
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up part of their wages. In United States v. Laudani,141 the clause
"whoever induces" was held to include a company foreman with
authority to hire and discharge who, for his own benefit, compelled
surrender of a portion of the employees' wages. If a person has the
authority to hire or discharge, and procures kickbacks by threatening
to dismiss the workers, little difficulty is encountered in finding him
guilty under the act.142 If a person with such authority agrees to
employ only those approved by others, and kickbacks are required to
gain the requisite approval, the persons accepting the kickbacks may
be found guilty. Since the case of United States v. Fuller143 decided
in 1943, this premise has consistently been upheld in indictments
against union officials.
The Supreme Court has expressly refrained from attempting "to
delineate the outside scope of the act's application," 144 but has made
clear that the act does not apply "to every extortioner, blackmailer
or other person who extracts money from one who has previously
received it for labor on a federally financed project."145 The case
which came closest to defining the outer limits of the act involved the
prosecution of a foreman on a Tennessee Valley Authority project who
admittedly did not have the authority to hire or fire employees on
his crew;146 he could only recommend dismissal for cause. In such a
case, the contracting agency would then inquire of the employee
whether he had been treated fairly. 147 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the statute applied to anyone
who possesses "the power to affect the employment relationship. 148
The money extracted "must be paid in return for the exercise of that
power in a way favorable to the employee."149 The case involved
the sufficiency of the indictment and thus, the court did not pass on
the action of the accused in requiring two dollars per working
day from each member of his crew. Implicit in the court's decision is
the requirement that the extortioner must in fact be able to affect the
employment relationship. In the case under discussion, it seems
141. 320 U.S. 543 (1944).
142. See United States v. McGraw, 47 F. Supp. 927 (N.D.N.Y. 1942).
143. 51 F. Supp. 951 (N.D.N.Y. 1943) (Employer's agent agreed to hire only
persons approved by union officials. Such officials indicated for violation for requiring
kickback for their approval). To the same effect under similar facts see, United States
v. Alsup, 219 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955); United States v.
Hullinharst, 141 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. La. 1956); United States v. Lombard, 54 F.
Supp. 537 (W.D.N.Y. 1944).
144. United States v. Laudani, supra note 141, at 548.
145. Ibid.
146. United States v. Price, 224 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876
(1955).
147. Id. at 606.
148. Id. at 608.
149. Ibid.
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that the defendant did not possess this power. If he recommended
that a non-paying worker be discharged for some trumped up cause,
the investigation by the agency almost assuredly would have revealed
the illegal scheme. Yet, the case is important for its principle that one
who possesses less than the power to hire and fire may be found
guilty under the act. Thus, if a person obtains kickbacks by threat-
ening to exercise his power to discipline, demote, promote, transfer
or otherwise "affect the employment relationship," it appears that he
will be in violation of the Copeland Act.
The circumspection of certain activities of union officials has
been attempted by Copeland Act prosecutions. As earlier discussed,
the Government has been successful in its prosecution of union officials
who required kickbacks from employees to gain the indispensable
union approval of their employment. 50 However, the case of United
States v. Carbone'5' laid down what has become an established
precedent in closed shop situations where the union officials require
employees to remit initiation fees as a condition of their employment.
The case was decided before section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act 52 eliminated the closed shop, but the same problem
can still exist in a valid union shop arrangement. The defendants in
Carbone required all workers to pay an initiation fee of twenty dollars
in five dollar installments. If a worker terminated his employment
on the project before paying the full fee, the defendants pocketed
the previously paid installments. In holding that the union officials
were not guility of violating the Copeland Act the Court said:
There is nothing in the legislative history to support the thesis that the
statute was intended to affect legitimate union activities. Nor was it
intended to be used to punish unlawful acts, including those committed
by union officials in violation of union rules, that are not in the nature
of kickbacks .... It is enough to note that this Act was designed solely to
prevent workers from wrongfully being deprived of their full wages and
that evils relating to the internal management of unions were matters with
which Congress did not concern itself in enacting the Kickback Act.'5 3
The Court held that the assessments were lawful when made and
that the defendants had the right to make them on behalf of the
unions. The later conversion of the money by the union officials was
deemed to be outside the scope of the act. The statute is not a
general extortion statue and the prosecution of persons who fraudu-
lently obtain money from workers must be sought under other
150. United States v. Fuller, supra note 143.
151. 327 U.S. 633 (1946).
152. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1964).
153. United States v. Carbone, supra note 151, at 639.
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laws. If the money given up by the employees is pursuant to a
lawful assessment at the time of remittance, then the later conversion
is not covered by the act. Thus, a person who absconds with federal
taxes or other funds lawfully withheld from workers has not violated
the Copeland Act. In many situations, general embezzlement statutes
would appear to be adequate for the prosecution of offenders. The
problem with such statutes, however, is that the Government, in
order to effectively prosecute, must gain the cooperation of the
organization which suffered the embezzlement. The problems in-
volved in such a situation are apparent, but the Court is probably
right in its assertion that the Copeland Act was not designed to cover
such actions. Only when the workers are required, in the general
sense of the term, to kickback part of their wages to protect their
jobs will the Copeland Act be violated.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing consideration of Walsh-Healey, Davis-Bacon, and
the Work-Hours Act of 1962 reveals, Congress has sought through
divergent means to use the federal government's purchasing power
to require those contracting with it to assent to numerous provisions
regarding wages and working conditions. Although it might be
possible for one comprehensive statute to regulate wages and working
conditions on all government contracts, Congress has seen fit to enact
different statutes to regulate the two major classifications of govern-
ment contracts. The Walsh-Healey Act is concerned with supply
contracts while construction and repair contracts are governed by
Davis-Bacon and the Work-Hours Act of 1962.
The differences in the administration of the acts are substantial,
especially in regard to hearings on violations and subsequent adminis-
trative and judicial review. Also, the penalties imposed for violations
of these acts are strikingly different in some instances. For example,
under a Walsh-Healey contract, a contractor who fails to compensate
employees at the stipulated rates, including overtime, is subjected to
the possibility of contract cancellation and liability for any excess cost
that the government incurs in its completion. No such governmental
action is provided against breaching contractors under the Davis-
Bacon or the Work-Hours Act. Neither do these latter acts provide
for the imposition of the ten dollars a day penalty for the employment
of minors as does the Walsh-Healey Act. However, the Walsh-Healey
contractor is not subjected to the penalty of ten dollars a day for each
employee who does not receive the required overtime rate of pay
as the Work-Hours Act, which applies to Davis-Bacon contracts, pro-
vides. Why Congress has applied different penalties to different
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types of contracts is not always readily apparent.54 Perhaps the
reason construction contracts are not subject to cancellation is that
such action would, in many cases, entail the removal of special
construction equipment and the necessity of another contractor at-
tempting to complete a structure which was perhaps started under
methods unfamilar to him. Why failure to pay overtime on construc-
tion contracts should result in the imposition of a penalty of ten dollars
a day per underpaid employee and not on supply contracts is not at
all clear.
Turning to the administration of the acts, it is apparent that Walsh-
Healey contractors have the advantage of more thorough administra-
tive hearings and review. The adversary hearing before a trial examiner
with appeal available to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division and then the further availability of appeal of the blacklisting
penalty to the Secretary of Labor results in a more thorough review
of the facts and law than does the Davis-Bacon and Work-Hours
procedures. Under the latter statutes the Solicitor General conducts
investigations and renders his decision as to the breach. The only
possible administrative appeal if the overtime provision is not in
issue is to the Wage Appeals Board. However, this board is directed
to review only those cases concerning substantial sums of money, large
numbers of employees, or novel situations. Under this standard it is
obvious that few cases will be reviewed by the Board. When the
Solicitor General imposes liquidated damages for breach of overtime
provisions, the contractor is afforded more complete administrative
review as he may appeal to the head of the contracting agency and
then to the Secretary of Labor. No good reason can be advanced
why the provisions for administrative review are so different under
these statutes, but it does seem that fewer Davis-Bacon and Work-
Hours cases would require court review if they were subject to the
more exhaustive administrative review afforded Walsh-Healey con-
tracts. The contractor who participates in an adversary proceeding
before an impartial examiner and then is allowed to appeal to the
administrator of all public contracts is more likely to accept an adverse
decision than is one who is found in default by the Solicitor General
and has little chance of appeal.
One other advantage which Walsh-Healey contracts offer is the pos-
sibility of judicial review of otherwise non-reviewable administrative
determinations as provided by statute. The Fulbright Amendment to
Walsh-Healey was a recognition that the government should not be
154. The legislative history of these statutes offers no clue to the difference in
treatment regarding penalties. For a discussion of the legislative history see, Hearings
before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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able to impose its own determination of prevailing wages, black-
listing, and many terms of definition in the act on potential contrac-
tors. The common law rule that a person must suffer a legal wrong
before he may seek court redress has been replaced in Walsh-Healey
by allowing any "interested person" to seek judicial determination of
administrative action. However, the old rule still applies under other
government contracts. It is not apparent why Congress has not seen
fit to amend these other acts to afford contractors more ready access
to the courts.
The administrative proceedings of Walsh-Healey coupled with easy
access to the courts lead to decisions which are accepted as definitive
by both contractors and the Government. Congress should re-
consider many of the provisions of the other acts dealing with labor
standards and conform them to the preferable provisions of Walsh-
Healey.155
C. THOMAS CATrs
155. It is recognized that there are differences in supply contracts and construction
contracts which will always necessitate some different statutory treatment. It is in
regard to penalties and administrative and judicial hearings and review that the statutes
should be more alike.
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